Abstract-Existing approaches on privacy-preserving data publishing rely on the assumption that data can be divided into quasi-identifier attributes (QI) and sensitive attribute (SA). This assumption does not hold when an attribute has both sensitive values and identifying values, which is typically the case. In this paper, we study how such attributes would impact the privacy model and data anonymization. We identify a new form of attacks, called "freeform attacks", that occur on such data without explicit QI attributes and SA attributes. We present a framework for modeling identifying/sensitive information at the value level, define a problem to eliminate freeform attacks, and outline an efficient solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) focuses on publishing person-specific data (also called microdata) for the benefit of research. Previous works have considered microdata of the form T (A 1 , ..., A m , SA). Each record corresponds to an individual. SA is the sensitive attribute. QI={A 1 , · · · , A m }, called the quasi-identifier, is a set of attributes that can be linked with an external source such as a voter list. In a linking attack, the adversary knows that some individual has a record in T , and observes the information qi on QI about the individual from an external source. The adversary's goal is to find the SA value of the individual. If the records in T that match qi are predominantly associated with a common SA value, the adversary could infer the individual's SA value with a high probability.
A. Abandoning the QI/SA paradigm
A fundamental assumption in previous works is that T can be split (vertically) into QI and the sensitive attribute SA. In this paper, the term QI/SA paradigm refers to this assumption and the works based on it. k-anonymity [1] , l-diversity [2] and recent works all fall into this QI/SA paradigm. A common approach in the QI/SA paradigm is hiding the association between QI and SA. To this end, the generalization approach [1] partitions records into equivalence classes according to QI, and the bucketization approach [3] split records into subrecords according to the partition of QI and SA. Multiple QIs and their associations with SA at value level are considered in [4] . Nevertheless, it still relies on the distinction between QIs and SA. Our insight is that determining QI and SA can be tricky and even undesirable. To explain this point, let us consider an example. 
One solution is suppressing the sensitive AIDS, T B and all exact incomes, as in T2 in Figure 1(b). This solution loses too much information since sensitive values usually are important for data analysis. A preferred solution is generalizing F lu and AIDS to V I, as in Figure 1(c), and the result table T3 is safe for release. For example, {F, V I} → 190K has only 50% certainty and {M, High} → V I is no longer a threat because V I is non-sensitive.
This example illustrates several interesting points. First, information on sensitive attributes may be observed on an individual. The QI/SA paradigm assumes that no information on SA can be observed on an individual. In the above example, F lu for Disease and High for Income can be observed. Both Disease and Income are considered sensitive attributes. This example shows that, even for such attributes, a less sensitive value or a higher level value can be easily observed.
Second, "public" and "sensitive" information often is distinguished at the value level. The QI/SA paradigm assumes that for each attribute, either all values are public or all values are sensitive. In the above example, Income and Disease have both types of values. The QI/SA paradigm is handicapped in dealing with such attributes: treating them as SA would under-protect the data because observable values (such as F lu and High)) are mistakenly treated as non-observable, whereas treating them as QI attributes would over-protect because some sensitive values (such as 190K and AIDS) may not be easily observed.
Third, a linking attack may be through observing a different set of attributes for a different individual. The attack {M, High} → AIDS on the individual P 1 is by observing values on Sex and Income, whereas the attack {F, F lu} → 190K on the individual P 2 is by observing values on Sex and Disease. The QI/SA paradigm essentially assumes that all individuals have the same set of observable attributes and the same sensitive attribute. This is not reasonable because the adversary will not confine herself to any pre-determined QI.
B. Challenges and contributions
We consider a table T (A 1 , . .., A m ) where each attribute A i has both observable values and sensitive values. To our knowledge, this is the first work that addresses the linking attacks under this setting. The following summarizes the challenges and our contributions.
Challenge/Contribution 1: The first challenge is modeling observability and sensitivity "at the value level". Requiring the publisher to specify this information for all domain and generalized values is neither feasible nor scalable. We present a framework for these specifications, with an focus on general principles so that new instantiations can be adapted.
Challenge/Contribution 2: We identify a class of freeform attacks of the form X → a, where a and the values in X can be at any level of any attributes. X → a is a privacy breach if X is observable, a is sensitive, and X is associated with a. A unique challenge posed by freeform attacks is that they may occur at a general level without occurring at a special level. We propose the notion of FF-anonymity (F reeF orm-anonymity) to eliminate freeform attacks.
Challenge/Contribution 3: We show that finding an optimal FF-anonymization is NP-hard and present an efficient solution for finding a "minimally generalized", not necessarily optimal, FF-anonymization.
II. MODELING SENSITIVITY AND OBSERVABILITY

A. Terminology
Consider a set of attributes U = {A 1 , ..., A m }. Each A j has a taxonomy (tree) arranged from general values at high levels to specific values at low levels. "Nodes" and "values" are interchangeable. AN Y j denotes the root of the taxonomy for A j , Subtr(a) denotes the subtree under a node a, and Leaf (a) denotes the set of all leaf nodes in Subtr(a). For two values a and a , a a means that either a = a or a is an ancestor of a.
A base 
B. Sensitivity model
Consider a value a for some attribute A i . The sensitivity of a, denoted s(a), measures the degree to which the publisher considers a sensitive. We assume that the publisher is able to specify each leaf node a as either sensitive or non-sensitive, i.e., s(a) = 1 or s(a) = 0, respectively. This can be done by specifying a set of highest possible nodes to cover all sensitive leaf nodes, called a guarding set. A leaf node a is sensitive if and only if a is in Leaf (g) for some node g in the guarding set. Let sLeaf (a) denote the set of sensitive leaf nodes in Leaf (a).
Example 2.1: Consider the taxonomy for Disease in Figure 1. The guarding set GS1 = {AIDS, T B} specifies the sensitive leaf nodes AIDS and T B. GS2 = {AIDS, BI} specifies the sensitive leaf nodes AIDS, E.Coli and T B.
The publisher does not need to specify s(a) for nonleaf nodes a because this will be specified automatically by our model. 
Definition 2.1 (Sensitivity Principle): The sensitivity of a, s(a), conveys the probability that a originates from sensitive leaf values in Leaf (a). This probability is the publisher's interpretation of the sensitivity of a.
The exact interpretation of probability depends on the instantiation for "a originates from sensitive leaf values in Leaf (a)". We leave this instantiation open so that a new instantiation can be "plugged in" through s (a) . Below, we demonstrate this flexibility by considering two instantiations.
The aggregate instantiation. In this instantiation, s(a) measures the probability that a comes from any sensitive leaf node in Leaf (a), defined as:
That is, s(a) is the fraction of sensitive leaf nodes in Leaf (a).
In particular, this instantiation makes no distinction among individual sensitive leaf nodes and the publisher considers it sensitive to infer that a comes from any sensitive leaf node sLeaf (a). The non-aggregate instantiation. In many cases, sensitivity arises from the specificity of a property. Location privacy is such an example. This notion of sensitivity s(a) can be measured by the probability that a comes from a particular sensitive leaf node in Leaf (a). Unlike the aggregate instantiation, this instantiation distinguishes among sensitive leaf nodes. Under the uniform distribution, the probability that a comes from a particular leaf node in Leaf (a) is 1/|Leaf (a)| and the probability that a given leaf node in Leaf (a) is sensitive is |sLeaf (a)|/|Leaf (a)|. Therefore, under the independence assumption, the probability that a comes from a particular sensitive leaf node is
There is no requirement that the same instantiation be used for all attributes. The choice of instantiation should be based on what probabilistic interpretation is desired for an attribute.
C. Observability model
For a valueset X in Cut + (Attset, T * ), the observability of X, denoted o(X), measures the degree to which the publisher considers X as observable to the adversary. Our observation is that, for two valuesets X and X with X X, whenever X is observed on some individual, X is observed on the same individual because X is an instance of X . For example, observing the exact income 170K implies observing the income bracket High. This leads to the following principle. Since observing a valueset X entails observing every value in X, the "bottleneck" is the least observed value in X. So we define o(X) by min{o(a) | a ∈ X}. For a given threshold σ o , we say that X is observable if o(X) ≥ σ o . Below, we consider two instantiations for specifying o(a) for a single value a on some attribute.
The sensitivity based instantiation. The first instantiation is based on the intuition that a sensitive value is hard to observe and a non-sensitive value is easy to observe. Therefore, if all the leaf nodes in Leaf (a) are sensitive, it is hard to observe a, so o(a) = 0; if some leaf node in Leaf (a) is non-sensitive, such leaf nodes can be observed, and a can be observed following Observability Principle, so o(a) = 1. Corollary 2.1: The sensitivity based and belief based instantiations satisfy Observability Principle.
Our approach does not depend on the exact instantiation for o(X) and s(a). The only requirement is that they follow Observability Principle and Sensitivity Principle. Therefore, a new instantiation for o(X) and s(a) can be easily incorporated into our approach.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENTS
A. Privacy breaches
Consider a published t(X → a) depends on two probabilities. The first is the probability that a record in T * matching X matches a, i.e., P (a|X) = sup (Xa) sup (X) . The second is the probability that a originates from a sensitive leaf node in Leaf (a), i.e., s(a).
Theorem 3.1: For an attack X → a wrt T * , under the independence assumption of P (a|X) and s(a), t(X → a) = P (a|X) * s(a).
(3) With the aggregate instantiation of s(a), t(X → a) is the probability that a record in T * matching X is associated with any sensitive leaf node in Leaf (a); with the non-aggregate instantiation of s(a), t(X → a) is the probability that a record in T * matching X is associated with a particular sensitive leaf node in Leaf (a). We consider X → a to be a privacy breach if t(X → a) is large enough. 
